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I. Introduction 
My claim is that we need to think more about what is called thinking in education. We 
need to think more, that is, about what happens when we think, about the things we 
think about, and about the nature of the human being who thinks. I claim that the theory 
of thinking is currently dominated by a limited conception of thinking, which I 
designate by the term of art “rationalistic”. However, I also argue that a way beyond 
this conception can be opened via a phenomenological exploration of thinking, which 
does more justice to the possibilities of the ways we think. 
In the later sections of this chapter, I will say more about this phenomenological 
account of thinking. I will also illustrate what an education for the development of 
thinking might look like following this kind of approach. However, I will begin by 
examining the current theories of thinking in education – in particular, the areas of 
critical thinking, thinking skills and philosophy for children. I will do so with a view to 
exemplifying that a shared conception of the nature of thinking is at work in such 
accounts.  
II. Today’s Thinking 
Critical Thinking 
I begin with the critical thinking movement: a major field of theory and a key place in 
which thinking has been conceptualised within education in recent years. The genesis 
of the philosophical literature on this topic can be traced back at least as far as the 1960s 
and the work of Robert Ennis, who defined the concept of critical thinking as “the 
correct assessing of statements” and, more fully, as “reasonable, reflective thinking, 
focused on deciding what to believe or do” (Ennis, 1989, p. 4). While subsequent 
conceptions of critical thinking were developed by theorists Richard Paul and John 
McPeck, perhaps the most influential account of critical thinking is that advanced by 
the American philosopher Harvey Siegel. For more than three decades, Siegel has 
defended a highly developed “reasons conception” of critical thinking. This resumes 
the idea that a critical thinker as one who is “appropriately moved by reasons” and has 
the ability to “believe and act on the basis of reasons” (1988, p. 3). A distinctive feature 
of Siegel’s account, however, is the link it asserts between such reason assessment and 
the fields of logic and epistemology. For Siegel, logic affords subject-natural laws and 
models ideal forms of argument, and these constitute generic principles that are 
indispensible for the assessment of reasons and beliefs. Epistemology, meanwhile, 
provides critical thinkers with “some understanding of why a given putative reason is 
to be assessed as it is”; that is, epistemology enables critical thinkers to have “a 
theoretical grasp of the nature of reasons, warrant and justification” (1988, p. 35).  
Thinking Skills 
In the last decade, focus in the theory of thinking has also turned to a discussion of 
“thinking skills”. This notion first made its appearance within educational policy, and 
has been around at least since the British National Curriculum of 2004. Within the 
policy literature thinking skills were characterised as certain kinds of procedural 
knowledge (“know-how”) – functional capacities that were generalizable across a 
number of contexts. A number of different types of skills were identified. For example, 
QCA defined thinking skills in terms of “information-processing”; “reasoning skills”; 
“enquiry skills”; “creative thinking skills” and “evaluation skills” (QCA, 2004, p. 22-
23). 
Thinking skills was thus a concept that covered a somewhat broader range of thinking 
than that in focus under the concept of critical thinking. As a result, some critical 
confrontation between theorists of critical thinking and thinking skills occurred. 
Thinking skills theorists claimed that their concept goes further than that of critical 
thinking, and charged the latter with perpetuating a too narrow focus on reasoning (see 
for example Smith, 2002). Nevertheless, it is also the case that a number of theorists of 
thinking skills have themselves been concerned at the potentially loose nature of the 
concept. One attempt to combat such a problem comes from Gerald Smith, who sought 
to provide a clearer analysis of what can be meaningfully identified as a “skill” in 
thinking. Specifically, Smith has argued that skills in thinking should be understood 
like physical skills – hence we should call thinking skills only those mental acts that 
have “procedural content” or a “procedural structure” (p. 663-664). In this way, Smith 
characterises thinking skills as cognitive acts that are (or are in principle capable of 
being) “schematised or purposively sequenced” (p. 661). Such procedures, Smith 
claims, are generic and transferable.  
Smith finds his analysis of the concept of thinking skills to “strongly support the 
practice of teaching thinking apart from the domain-specific content” (p. 676). On this 
point, Smith’s theory bears some comparison with what is happening in many 
educational programmes dedicated to the teaching of thinking in schools today. To take 
an example of a formal qualification currently on offer in the British curriculum, the 
Cambridge International Examination (CIE) A Level in Thinking Skills conceives its 
purpose similarly in terms of developing “a specific set of intellectual skills, 
independent of subject content” (CIE, 2013). Such an agenda is stated to be “reflecting 
the need voiced by universities and employers for more mature and sophisticated ways 
of thinking”. Another formal qualification in thinking, the Oxford, Cambridge and RSA 
(OCR) A Level in Critical Thinking, claims to “provide candidates with a framework, 
which can be applied in a practical manner to a range of materials, situations, problems 
and issues” (OCR, 2013). On this course, the Specification asserts, “there is no obvious 
major body of content to deliver”, and the focus is instead on “a set of skills that 
candidates should be enabled to acquire” (OCR, 2013). 
Philosophy for Children 
Holding out on an analysis of these theories and practices a little longer, let us consider 
a third related branch of educational theory of thinking: Philosophy for Children. This 
is a diverse field with many factions. Yet an emphasis on the development of thinking 
has been present within this movement since its inception in the 1970s (see Gregory, 
2011, p. 120). Patricia Hannam and Eugenio Echeverria’s book Philosophy with 
Teenagers (2009), provides a representative example of this kind. A distinctive aspect 
of this field is the appeal to the pedagogical technique of a “community of inquiry”. 
This is an arena for discussion and, as Hannam and Echeverria put it, as a tool to 
“promote cooperation in illuminating a path to come closer to the truth of things” (p. 
8). Notably, however, when adding more detail to what is involved in such a process, 
Hannam and Echeverria, cite the activities of “constructing, defining and clarifying 
concepts”, and conceive the goals of such a process as the “gradual development of 
thinking and reasoning skills” (p. 8).  
In recent years, a series of broader arguments have been made in defence of the role of 
philosophy in schools – some of which have also asserted a link between philosophy 
and the development of thinking (see for example the collection by Hand, 2008). For 
example, Carrie Winstanley (2008) has defended two theses regarding the connection 
between philosophy and thinking: firstly, that “critical thinking is the essence of 
philosophy” and secondly philosophy is a subject that is not dependent upon any 
“substantial empirical knowledge base” (p. 92). The first claim turns on the idea that 
philosophy is a discipline principally concerned with the “validity of inferences, the 
quality of arguments, and the meaning of words”, and is “the embodiment of the 
abilities of exploring ideas with logic and rationality” (p. 87 and p. 92). The second 
thesis suggests that philosophical discussion focuses on “concepts, ideas, and the logic 
of arriving at the views held”, and that discussion of the “reasons, coherence of 
argument and the rationality of the notions under examination” can be achieved without 
recourse to any substantial knowledge base (p. 92). Philosophy is seen as a tool for 
developing thinking, then, because it is taken to be a subject principally concerned with 
how to “assess reasons, defend positions, define terms, evaluate sources of information, 
and judge the value of arguments and evidence” (p. 93). 
III. Lines of Rationalism 
I want to claim that there is a family resemblance – a series of overlapping similarities 
– between the theories of thinking just rehearsed. While it is not possible to offer a full 
picture of this here (though see Williams 2016; 2015), in what follows, I will draw out 
show two central resemblance structures and seek to expose the philosophical 
assumptions that stand behind such structures, validating their idea(l)s.  
Narrow argument 
The first set of resemblances regards the foregrounding of particular conceptions of 
rationality, reasoning and argument. On the basis of what has been sketched above, it 
is not too hard to see that the notions of reasoning and argument are central constituents 
of accounts of critical thinking and philosophy for children. Moreover, it is not too hard 
to get a sense of what reasoning and argument are themselves being taken to consist of 
– usually, processes of activities such as conceptual analysis, inferential reasoning, and 
the production of logically sound syllogisms. Although theorists of thinking skills on 
one hand sought to get beyond an emphasis on reasoning, it can also be seen that similar 
notions of reasoning and argument also play a part in this tradition. Indeed “reasoning 
skills” are featured in the inventory of presented by the policy literature. Furthermore, 
and on reflection, it might also be said that a number of the supposedly additional 
cognitive capacities invoked in the thinking skills literature themselves may not be all 
that far removed from what goes under the banner of “reasoning”, especially in the way 
it is conceived within the critical thinking movement. Are “evaluation skills” and 
“enquiry skills” not themselves part and parcel of what good reasoning consists in? 
Perhaps, then, it is not all that surprising that Gerald Smith’s more sophisticated 
analysis ends by specifying that “deductive reasoning, causal diagnosis, argument 
construction and conceptual analysis” are the only candidates to which the concept of 
“thinking skills” can be meaningfully applied (2002, p. 665).  
It is important to be clear about where I am going with the reference to this resemblance 
structure here. What I am not working towards is the simple suggestion that just because 
all predominant theories of thinking show a commitment to rationality, reasoning and 
argument, they are problematic. Indeed, it would be absurd to say this and it would be 
quite contrary to what I wish to suggest. For I take it that reasoning, rationality and 
providing arguments are key to thinking education – but, and this is a crucial caveat, 
there are different ways of reasoning and of exemplifying rationality. The problem with 
the predominant accounts of thinking in education, as I want to contend, is not, then, 
that they foreground the importance of rationality or of reasoning, or even of arguments. 
It is rather with the determined conception of reasoning and argument that is at work 
in the predominant accounts.  
What conception is this? As I see it, the predominant accounts of thinking education all 
buy into a particular philosophical model, whereby effective reasoning is taken to be 
tantamount the presence of an “argument” – itself understood in a highly specific way 
as (ideally) a discussion that moves through a series of explicit and articulated 
inferences (using what philosophers call “propositions”), with a view to reaching a 
conclusion. I say “highly specific” so as to highlight how this conception is depending 
on a particular philosophical commitment – for having an “argument” in ordinary life 
often does not often proceed in this kind of way. Simon Glendinning has used the term 
“narrow argument” to characterise this “step-by-step” or “plain-speaking 
argumentative mode”, which is held up as being exemplary in certain areas of 
philosophy today (2007, p. 20-22). This is a view that is further connected to the idea 
(l) that it is our ratiocinative capacities that are “of first importance” when it comes to 
formulating arguments and offering reasons (p. 20). We shall come back to this point 
shortly. 
Formal mapping 
Let me now bring in the second resemblance structure I wish to highlight. This connects 
in important ways to the special conception of reasoning and argument we have just 
been unfolding. The structure in question relates, specifically, to the valorisation of 
generic and universal procedures of thinking within predominant discussions of 
thinking in education and the nearly ubiquitous reference to non-domain specificity. 
The very coinage “thinking skills” enshrines such a standpoint most evidently – 
rendering as it does the idea that there are formal operations of thinking that can be 
mapped, sequenced, and exercised in a number of different contexts. Yet it is worth 
noting that the conception of “skills” such a picture hereby invokes – as bundles of 
knacks whose exercise does not involve and specialised knowledge – is something that 
has been elsewhere called into question as itself a false and reductive view of skills. It 
is not possible to attend to this argument in full here.i Yet my claim is that an emphasis 
on generality and universality is not a feature of the thinking skills literature alone. It is 
perhaps worth noting here that, as we saw above, in the realm of educational practice 
where the teaching of thinking has come to be formally included on the school 
curriculum, it has tended to take the form of qualifications that emphasise the teaching 
of “skills” and “frameworks” rather than “independent subject content” or a “major 
body of content.” Yet a similar commitment is also exemplified in the other 
predominant theoretical discussions of thinking in education. Hence, as we saw above, 
recent defences of the role of philosophy in schools have asserted a link between 
philosophy and the development of thinking on the grounds that the discipline has no 
“substantial empirical knowledge base” of its own – a sentiment that appears to be 
echoed in the way that philosophy is employed as by certain factions of the philosophy 
for children tradition. Meanwhile, the tradition of critical thinking also exemplifies a 
commitment to the idea(l) that reason assessment can hold consistently across a number 
of domains. As Siegel argued, criteria governing reason assessment are not subject-
specific, but are rather the subject-neutral laws or principles of logic. For Siegel, 
moreover, such principles are generated by the philosophical tradition of epistemology 
– a universal tool for acquiring “a theoretical grasp of the nature of reasons, warrant 
and justification”. 
What can we make of all this? I once again want to suggest that this shared commitment 
to generic and universal processes of thinking is grounded in specific philosophical 
assumptions – about the nature of thinking and the way thinking happens. At this point, 
it will be useful to draw upon what Charles Taylor has identified as the 
“representational” conception of thinking. Representational views of thinking are the 
product of a particular philosophical tradition that can be traced back to Descartes. 
Descartes time was one of scientific revolution, and new aims for thinking at this time 
came to prominence. One in particular was the construal of thinking in terms of a 
project of knowledge – itself determined as “the correct representation of an 
independent reality”; “a certain relation holding between that is ‘out there’ and certain 
inner states that this external reality causes in us” (Taylor, 1997, p. 3-4). In connection 
with this, a new emphasis came to be place on the discovery of reliable methods – 
adherence to which was thought to generate confidence in our mental operations and 
produce certainty in knowledge (p. 4-5). Taylor argues that, as a result, thinking came 
to be understood mechanistically – the content of our thoughts needed to be analysed 
and ordered explicitly “according to clear and distinct connections” (p. 5). Moreover, 
in line with the “representational” characterisation Taylor presents, thinking came to be 
understood as a depiction of the outer world. And these, in turn, have certain 
consequences for understandings of the thinking being or the picture of the mind-in-
world.  
The point of Taylor’s analysis of the representational view is to open up the realisation 
that, even when the particular enterprise for knowledge instigated Descartes came to be 
repudiated (by contemporary work in analytical epistemology that rejects his 
foundationalism, for example), certain wider and deeper assumptions this project gave 
rise to – particularly about the nature of thinking and the human being who thinks – 
have been retained. Taylor specifically pinpoints such retention within the “strong draw 
towards distinguishing and mapping the formal operations of our thinking” enshrined 
by computer models of the mind (1997, p. 5-6). For Taylor, such domains manifest a 
“widespread faith that our intelligent performances are ultimately to be understood in 
terms of formal operations” – a faith whose strength derives from “the depths of our 
modern culture and the … model anchored in it” (p. 6). I would suggest that a similar 
faith pervades the predominant theories of thinking today. For via the notions of 
generalisability and universalisability, such accounts promulgate a mechanistic and 
representational picture of thinking. They manifest a similar draw towards the mapping 
and sequencing of thinking in formal and controlled procedures – a similar 
unquestioned belief in methods as the means for generating confidence in oneself and 
the ways one thinks. 
Subjects and Objects 
I should like to go a little further with the analysis at this point. For I also want to 
suggest that these resemblances structures – of reasoning and the narrow argument, and 
of generalisability and universalisability – themselves depend upon certain assumptions 
about the human being who thinks (and about the things we think about). We began to 
glimpse something of this above within Taylor’s account, but let me now make this 
more explicit. For I would claim that a precondition for understanding thinking as the 
depiction of reality and as what is to be conceived in formal terms, is the positioning of 
the human being who thinks as somehow separate from the world and standing apart 
from it. That is, the representational a view depends on the idea that the human being 
is disengaged from the world – and is dependent or reliant on the world in any way. 
Such disengagement in fact appears to be logically necessary once the aim of thinking 
is conceived in terms of knowledge and the accurate representation of external reality. 
For this achievement involves the idea(l) of grasping the world “objectively” – as it is 
in itself. And this means, as Charles Taylor (2013) has pointed out, grasping the world 
as “a third person observer would.” For this to happen we must step away from the 
world of our ordinary everyday experience. We must disinvest the world of objects 
around us of any meaning – for example the everyday meanings of a light switch that 
is out of reach; a deadline for work that is pressing on me; or a person who attracts me 
(Taylor, 2013). Furthermore, we must divest ourselves of intuitions, sensibilities and 
affective endowments. This is a radical sense of disengagement – from our ordinary 
modes of existence and from things as we ordinarily find them. It is an exclusion of 
anything that is not capable of being mapped in formal, third personal terms – hence 
we come to think according to articulable, quantifiable, formalisable lines or principles. 
This enshrines a certain valorisation of the cerebral and cognitive endowments of the 
human being. Our relation to the world becomes, as David Wood puts it, “in a real sense 
… a priori”. In doing this we come to occupy a position of mastery with respect to the 
world – like “a god enthroned, surveying its territory” (Wood, 2002, p. 47). Hence we 
can impose the generalizable principles whenever we are called to think, and whatever 
we are thinking about. 
IV. The Ways We Think 
A way beyond 
Having now discussed what philosophical assumptions I take to be informing the 
current predominant approaches to thinking education, I want to start to question these 
assumptions. However, in what follows I will not be providing ‘knock down’ argument 
of these assumptions. Rather, I will appeal to a range of philosophical accounts of 
thinking to work, via a kind of a cumulative effect, to bring into view a conception of 
thinking that goes beyond such assumptions and such ideals. 
It is perhaps worth saying something about what connects the philosophical accounts I 
will draw on here together. I want to suggest that this approach to thinking can be 
broadly construed as phenomenological. Now, phenomenology is a development in 
philosophy that took place during the twentieth century. I should like to follow Simon 
Glendinning (and others) in reading this development as one that “includes some of the 
major figures in contemporary philosophy” (2007, p. 5). More specifically, what I mean 
by “phenomenology” names not only a specific philosophical tradition, is rather 
exhibited in a particular kind of commitment. This is the commitment to doing justice 
to what is given in experience – to taking on the “imperative of staying with experience, 
acknowledging experience” (Wood, 2002, p. 33). In the context of the present 
discussion, this translates into the attempt to set aside philosophical presuppositions 
and assumptions about the nature of thinking, and instead do justice to the actual ways 
we think – which includes doing justice to the human being who thinks, as well as the 
things we think about.  
This is not to say that phenomenology can be taken as a unilateral philosophical 
method.ii In fact, there are significant differences between individual philosophers’ and 
philosophical traditions’ phenomenological approaches. This means that certain 
evaluative work is called for within this project. I will reflect this in what follows where 
I will discuss two pairs of couplets, comprising thinkers from contrasting (and at times 
opposing) philosophical traditions.  
‘Ahead of all beaten tracks’iii 
The first couplet to explore are the British ordinary language philosopher Gilbert Ryle 
and the German philosopher Martin Heidegger. What is particularly significant about 
the Heidegger-Ryle relation is the way both philosophers seek to provide a serious 
philosophical analysis of what is at stake in our everyday, engaged ways of thinking 
and behaving. This leads them to consider, not primarily intellectual and abstracted 
episodes of thinking (which had often been taken as exemplary in previous philosophy), 
but rather everyday episodes ranging from riding a bike, to hammering a nail into a 
wall. Through this, crucially, both Ryle and Heidegger come to offer quite a different 
– and more wide-ranging – account of our rational behaviour. In Ryle, this takes place 
through the discussion of what is at stake in what he calls knows how – practical modes 
of knowledge that he contrasts to knowing that (theoretical knowledge).iv Heidegger’s 
philosophy, meanwhile, discusses how humans are primarily and the for the most part 
beings who are involved and engaged in a world of concerns and projects. 
I read both Ryle and Heidegger as opening, through this, accounts of the conditions of 
thinking that go beyond philosophical traditions that construe human beings’ relation 
to the world primarily in terms of a detached, contemplative, theoretical grasp of an 
object. Of course, this is not to say Ryle and Heidegger are not in total agreement with 
one another. A source of critical confrontation is Ryle’s Review of Heidegger’s early 
text Being and Time. Yet one way of interpreting Ryle’s Review is that Ryle is himself 
still too wedded to those conceptions of Subject and Object, discussed above, to fully 
appreciate the Heideggerian position. For Heidegger’s account suggests that human 
beings come into a world that is already populated by a matrix of involvements, 
meanings and significances passed down to us by history and by culture. Such meanings 
are not wilfully and autonomously taken over by the human being, but are rather the 
background conditions that make all autonomous acting and behaving possible in the 
first place. This has implications for the ways we understand our practical modes of 
worldy comportment, but also for our contemplative and theoretical modes of thinking. 
For Heidegger, in fact, knowing as the contemplative grasp of a thing is itself ‘a founded 
way of being-in-the-world, a way which is always possible only on the basis of a non-
cognitive comportment’ (Heidegger, 1985 [1925], p. 162-164). Hence, Heidegger 
suggests, are always thinking within frameworks and matrices – detached, neutral 
thinking is a false ideal. These frameworks cannot themselves be turned into objects for 
critical reflection – or rather, if they are, such reflection will always be partial and 
selective, for there will always be further meanings and significances that remain un-
reflected upon. 
What task emerges for thinking following this picture? It is interesting to note that, in 
their later work, both Heidegger and Ryle come to stress the receptive nature of 
thinking. Ryle, for example, characterizes thinking in terms of a gradual event of 
‘dawning’, and as involving organic processes such as ‘germinating’ – and he contrasts 
this to academic conceptions of ‘disciplined’ thinking, which attempt make thoughts 
move ‘like soldiers on the barrack-square’ (i.e. in a highly regimented and controlled 
lines). Heidegger, comparatively, speaks negatively about the propositional and 
calculative ways of thinking that enact a kind of appropriating grasp of what is thought 
about. Against this, Heidegger construes thinking as a ‘handicraft’ – which invokes a 
sense of responsiveness that is further brought out by discussing the etymological 
relation between thinking and thanking. Heidegger’s term here also invokes the sense 
that learning to think is an apprenticeship. It is not, as Ryle also puts it, a ‘five minutes 
task’. Rather, learning to think is learning to dwell with and amongst the things we 
think about. Through this, new possibilities are opened for thinking, which are closed 
down if we just consider things one time, for one purpose, with a one-track mind. Some 
commentators read Heidegger’s later work as a misguided move in the direction of 
mysticism and romanticism. Yet I would see it as an attempt to carry through the 
exploration of the conditions of thinking that were already implicit in his early work. 
Through this Heidegger – and Ryle – bring us to see that thinking is not the act of an 
already-constituted subject that presides over already-constituted objects. The ways we 
think are made possible by structures of meanings and significances that are beyond us. 
In and through our reception of these structures, however, our thinking is inceptive and 
projective – it opens the possibilities of something new. 
Following the sign 
At this point, I want to cross over to a second philosophical couplet: John Austin and 
Jacques Derrida. For I would suggest that, through their particular attentiveness to 
language, these thinkers take further the account of thinking I have just been 
articulating. To understand why, it is important to recognise that, as Heidegger himself 
came to suggest in his later work, language is not simply a tool for human use – the 
‘outer external clothing’ for inward private thoughts that are in themselves fully fixed 
and secure in their intentional content. This view of language, in fact, goes somewhat 
hand in glove in the history of philosophy with the tradition of Subject and Object 
discussed above. Against this, however, is an alternative conception of language: one 
that takes language as itself the horizon within which human beings live their lives. 
This means language is fundamental to our thought and action – in fact to our being 
human. Moreover, this is not just language in the abstract but the particular language(s) 
we speak, and it is clear that different languages reveal the world in subtly different 
ways. In the light of this, it is worth considering the nature of the words and other signs 
(gestures, etc.) that we use, a topic to which few philosophers have given sufficient 
attention. Yet Derrida and Austin are notable exceptions. 
Austin’s exploration of language led him to discuss the nature of what he terms the 
“performative utterance”. A simple example of the “performative utterance” is an 
utterance such as “I declare this meeting open.” Such a phrase, as Austin puts it, does 
not describe a state of affairs in the world but rather does something – the utterance is 
itself the opening of the meeting. Moreover, what makes such an achievement happen 
is not, contrary to what is traditionally assumed, the fact that there is some hidden, 
internal intention in the mind of the speaker. Rather, as Austin points out, the success 
of a performative utterance is guaranteed by the specific nature of the context in which 
the phrase is uttered and the conformity of a phrase to a particular conventional 
procedure. Such a view tallies with Wittgenstein’s famous dictum that “meaning is 
use”: words get their meaning not by being attached to objects or thoughts like labels 
are placed on items, but rather in the way they are used and put to use within 
communities and cultures. 
Derrida shared Austin’s rejection to the traditional picture of language and meaning. 
However, in an infamous essay Signature Event Context Derrida also argues that 
Austin’s re-formulation of language has its own limitations. Derrida’s argument was 
controversial for Anglo-American interpretations of Austin, and sparked critical, and 
some hostile, reaction. Yet Derrida’s main concern was that Austin had held back from 
following through on a key insight about language that his discussion of the 
performative had, at the same time, opened. This is, in short, the way that it is a 
characteristic of the signs we use that they are “unsaturated” with meaning. This means 
that the signs are always available to new connotations and connections, and to new 
interpretations: in other words, they always have effects beyond our full control, beyond 
our intentions. At first sight, this looks both unconvincing and disturbing: is this not a 
new expression of the scepticism that says “we can never really know what we are 
doing?” That this is not the case is clear when it is seen that Derrida is describing the 
fundamental ways in which signs must function, the conditions within which we are 
sometimes clear about what we are doing and sometimes not. The signs that animals 
use are unlike the more or less mechanistic signs that charaterise the behaviour of the 
higher animals: their signs function in a more or less predictable functional way, and 
they function without remainder: animals carry on behaving the same way from 
generation to generation. The signs that human beings use, by contrast, are not static: a 
word is open to new connections and associations, we make inadvertent puns and 
Freudian slips, and we can project words into new contexts of use. A clear example of 
this last point is the use of the word “mouse” for the handy device that sits by the side 
of our keyboard. In poetic writing especially the possibilities of words and their 
potential connections, in sound and semantics, are explored in innovative ways. When 
small children speak they play with words, exploring new associations and connections. 
The fact that children, even in the earliest stages of language learning, produce original 
setnences is further testimony to this. This leads Derrida to a further claim, which again 
on the face of it is very surprising. This is that the unsaturatedness of the sign means 
that it depends upon something that is absent – upon connections and associations that 
have not yet been made. For the sign to be a sign it must be available to occasions of 
use that are not anticipated. We can imagine the unique construction of a tool for a 
particular purpose – a tool that existed for that purpose but then was never produced 
again. But a word qua word can never be like that. Even a neologism must be available 
to further contexts. Derrida’s expression for this is that the sign is iterable. A related 
way of thinking of it is that any sign, in order to be a sign, must be quotable. 
Hence, it is the idea of the human dependence on a necessary absence that has 
been so powerful in his work. But why is this of significance? It is important because 
it opposes any idea that good thinking brings the object of thought under control, 
grasping it fully. Once again, this is not to outlaw the idea that we can sometimes grasp 
things or to deny that we can ever be sure what we are doing. What is under attack is a 
more metaphysical assumption that typifies the epistemology in question: this is that 
the best kind of thinking is epitomised by my holding something fully present in my 
mind, here and now, in a way that is autonomous and independent. The fantasy of 
independence here – one seen at its extreme in both Descartes’ cogito ergo sum and in 
logical positivism (where my experience, here, now, are the ultimate authentication of 
the real) – derives from the fact that I lose sight of my necessary dependence not only 
on a background world but on the fact that the very terms of my thought depend upon 
usages that precede me and extend beyond me in ways beyond my control. This 
emphatically does not mean that I am simply determined by them, for the unsaturated 
nature of signs means that in my own thinking too they constantly find new connotation 
and connections. This is very engine of imagination and creativity and culture itself. 
Rigour and refinement in thinking will depend upon our attunement to these conditions. 
Beyond rationalism  
I have only provided a sketch of the alternative account of thinking I should like to 
propose here, and a number of threads that have been left hanging. However, we should 
already be coming to see how this conception moves beyond the lines of rationalism 
sketched above.  
For one, curtailing thinking to narrow argument will not do justice to openness that is 
constitutive of human thinking. For another, focusing on generic procedures of thinking 
that can be formalised does not do justice to co-dependency between the ways we think 
and what we are thinking about. Moreover, and linked to this, the guiding assumption 
that thinking happens through a detached and disengaged subject does not do justice to 
the mediated and constituted nature of the human being who thinks. That is to say, when 
we think we do not simply represent things and make calculations: our thinking is 
productive in that, as receptive, it allows the world to open to us in new ways; in a sense 
it is productive of the what the world can be, which is evident not only in the products 
of writers and artists but in the achievements of science and engineering themselves. 
We are not masters of what we think; we think productively when we are receptive and 
responsive in these ways. 
All of this is not, of course, to say that the rationalistic account is entirely redundant. It 
is not to say that we cannot do things like reason to reach a conclusion, use a technique 
for judging the credibility of evidence, or submit an idea to conceptual analysis. 
However, it is to warn against the unquestioning adoption of certain philosophical 
ideals that cause us to over inflate such practises and hence exclusively focus on them 
as the bread and butter of an education for thinking. Furthermore, we must recognise 
that the rationalistic way of thinking is itself an approach that is made possible on the 
basis of a certain disclosure or revealing of the world. This is an important point to 
make for, as we noted above, current conceptions of thinking, bolstered as they are by 
their underlying philosophical assumptions, have a tendency to overinflate themselves 
and set themselves up as the way in which thinking in education should operate. They 
thus have the corresponding effect of producing the idea that the way the world is 
disclosed under their guise is the way the world essentially is. Hence the relative ease 
and confidence, the sense of “of course-ness” that marks so much of the literature on 
thinking education today. And yet such values are important only if we are approaching 
the world in a certain way. Of course there is a place for such approaches, but there is 
a danger if such approaches masquerades as the best kind of thinking or the most 
rigorous kind. Hence they must be placed within the broader understanding of thinking 
that I am advocating here.  
Perhaps this discussion is taking place on too abstract a level. We want after all to say 
something about the education of thinking. Let me now turn to say something on this. 
V. Lived Experience 
What would a phenomenologically inspired approach to thinking in education look 
like? In what follows I will appeal to an example from my own work experience as the 
philosopher-in-residence in a UK secondary school (2008-2015).  
Thinking with Camus 
About two years ago, I was invited by a colleague in the Foreign Languages Department 
to join one of her lessons, in which they had been reading the play by Albert Camus, 
Les Justes, which is based on the true story of a group of Russian socialist 
revolutionaries who plan and execute the assassination of the Grand Duke Sergei 
Alexandrovich. In the course of studying this text a number of themes for discussion 
had emerged within the class. Knowing my background in philosophy, my colleague 
invited me along to stimulate further discussion of some of the themes. The brief was 
quite open; the teacher simply wanted her students to have the chance to re-engage with 
some of the interesting themes that had arisen in the course of the lessons. 
I hence decided to structure the lesson loosely around a number of themes that I had 
found prevalent within the text, offering a hand-out of five key quotes from the play as 
illustrative examples. I stated at the outset that the themes I had picked out were likely 
to have been largely informed by my prior knowledge of Camus as a philosopher. I thus 
invited the pupils to challenge my interpretations (and, it should be noted, they did not 
need too much encouragement!). We read and re-read the passages I had selected, 
opening up and negotiating new meanings and significances. One pupil, for example, 
drew the class’s attention to the epigraph at the outset of the play, which had 
interestingly not been included in my English translation. It was a quotation from 
Romeo and Juliet, Act IV Scene 5: “O love! O life! Not life but love in death”. Does 
this mean the play, which is often cast as having a political message, could be re-read 
as a love story? And what kind of “love” is being invoked? We also pondered the 
differences between reading text in the English translation I had provided and the 
original French version the students had studied. One student felt that it seemed like a 
different play to her when she read it in English; this provoked discussion about whether 
one language can ever do justice to another, or whether there is a sense in which 
something is lost in translation. I do not think we got past the first two quotes I had 
selected in the forty-minute lesson.  
This lesson did not end with a sense of self-satisfied contentment — as though we had 
got to the bottom of Les Justes and worked it all out. Rather we left realising the 
openness and richness of the text and the possibilities of interpretation that had emerged 
from our engagement with just a few sections of it.  
Contrasts 
This example does not serve to offer a complete picture of a pedagogical structure for 
teaching thinking. This has not been the aim. Rather it has been to appeal to a rich 
experience that can happen when we think - gesturing towards what thinking education 
might faithfully be.   Often at present, the teaching of thinking is happening via stand-
alone courses in their own right – qualifications that emphasise the teaching of “skills” 
and “frameworks” rather than “independent subject content” or a “major body of 
content”.  
Moreover, I was struck at the end of this class by just how different such a lesson had 
been from my usual experience of teaching existentialism within the A Level 
Philosophy course. Here, Sartre’s philosophy is introduced as a version of 
“Libertarianism”, and is pitted against the “other views” on the Free Will-Determinism 
debate, cast as “Determinism” and “Compatibilism”. Given the demands of the A level 
course (Free Will and Determinism is only one module out of four required to be studied 
in the first year), I am barely able to spend two forty-minute lessons discussing 
existentialism. The result is that there is no room for thinking about and responding to 
existentialism as there was in the above-cited Camus lesson. In fact, what my students 
(and we might recall here that these are philosophy students) often end up with is a 
sense that they know all there is to know about Sartre’s philosophy, simply because 
they can cite his argument in nugget form, and are able to roll out stock “criticisms” of 
it (that often largely comprise those listed in mark-schemes for previous exam 
questions). Of course, this is not necessarily my students’ fault. It is a result of an exam 
system that is driven by quantitative assessment, by the tick-box culture that pervades 
over education as a whole. Rather than provide the space for open and rigorous thinking 
of the kind I have articulated in this thesis and would contend is in operation in the 
above-cited example of the Camus class, the A Level Philosophy lesson on Sartre rather 
seems to enforce a thinking that works by way of closed regurgitation. 
Final words 
This example does not, of course, serve to offer a complete picture of a pedagogical 
structure for teaching thinking. This has not been the aim of the present chapter. Rather, 
I have tried to offer an account of a non-rationalistic conception of thinking — one that 
will overcome current closures and open new possibilities for thinking in education. If 
we are to take the non-rationalistic account seriously, it seems appropriate that we 
should not end with a fully spelled-out, definitive programme. It seems appropriate, 
indeed, that we should rather end by gesturing towards what thinking education might 
faithfully be. This will not be an education that would satisfy the rationalistic criteria 
for what counts as “good thinking” or, indeed, the good teaching of thinking. For 
teaching thinking will not be a matter of developing technical skills in reasoning or 
argument. It is not an approach that advocates a standing back, and a judging of what 
is being thought about in terms of objectively defined criteria or standards. Neither is it 
an approach that seeks to make explorations of issues reach a stable and steady, fixed 
and firm conclusion. The ways of thinking I want to explore are not the activity of the 
self-secure, autonomous and independent subject. Rather, they are ways of receptivity 
and responsiveness – in other words, the possibilities of thinking beyond the narrow 





i See for example Winch, 2009. 
ii Sometimes it is taken in this way, however. For more discussion see Glendinning, 2007. 
iii  The phrase “ahead of all beaten tracks” is used by Ryle in to illustrate the nature of 
philosophical thinking (Ryle, 2009b [1953], p. 312). It bears relation to the way Heidegger 
characterised philosophical thinking as the “way” and the Holzweg. Heidegger’s epigraph in 
Off the Beaten Track reads: “Wood is an old name for a forest. In the wood there are paths, 
mostly overgrown, that come to an abrupt stop where the wood is untrodden. They are called 
Holzwege . Each goes its separate way, though within the same forest. It often appears as if one 
is identical to another. But it only appears so. Woodcutters and forest keepers know these paths. 
They know what it means to be a Holzweg  (2002 [1950], p. 1).” The Heideggerian motif of 
the “way” informs my own notion of the ways we think.  
iv Notably, Ryle’s appearance within a project assessing the nature of thinking in education is 
not unprecedented. In fact, Ryle’s philosophy is often drawn upon in educational discussions 
of thinking; and paradoxically his distinction between “knowing how” and “knowing that” is 
often drawn upon to articulate the nature of thinking skills. However, I wish to point towards 
an alternative reading of Ryle —one that brings out the potentialities within his philosophy for 
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